project . 2016 - 2020 . Closed

BayesianMarkets

Bayesian markets for unverifiable truths
Open Access mandate for Publications European Commission
  • Funder: European CommissionProject code: 638408 Call for proposal: ERC-2014-STG
  • Funded under: H2020 | ERC | ERC-STG Overall Budget: 1,500,000 EURFunder Contribution: 1,500,000 EUR
  • Status: Closed
  • Start Date
    01 Jan 2016
    End Date
    31 Dec 2020
  • Detailed project information (CORDIS)
  • Open Access mandate
    Research Data: No
Description
Subjective data play an increasing role in modern economics. For instance, new welfare measurements are based on people’s subjective assessments of their happiness or their life satisfaction. A problem of such measurements is that people have no incentives to tell the truth. To solve this problem and make those measurements incentive compatible, I will introduce a new market institution, called Bayesian markets. Imagine we ask people whether they are happy with their life. On Bayesian markets, they will trade an asset whose value is the proportion of people answering Yes. Only those answering Yes will have the right to buy the asset and those answering No the ri...
Partners
Description
Subjective data play an increasing role in modern economics. For instance, new welfare measurements are based on people’s subjective assessments of their happiness or their life satisfaction. A problem of such measurements is that people have no incentives to tell the truth. To solve this problem and make those measurements incentive compatible, I will introduce a new market institution, called Bayesian markets. Imagine we ask people whether they are happy with their life. On Bayesian markets, they will trade an asset whose value is the proportion of people answering Yes. Only those answering Yes will have the right to buy the asset and those answering No the ri...
Partners
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