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On March 6, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen declared that all gatherings over 1000 people would be banned until at least August 31, 2020. This announcement, and subsequent further reductions in gathering numbers, effectively ‘cancelled the summer’ of music festivals and much more in 2020. In this paper, based on a study of three music festivals in Denmark, we focus on the un-making of music festivals and their creative re-making across diverse social spaces and contexts by multiple agents in response to the trauma of cancellation. The absence of music festivals points actors to a Corona-induced social and cultural lack, an emblematic fact referring to the loss of spaces of intense sociality and connection which we interpret via literatures on compressed cultural trauma. Our field research shows that lack and loss are not the defining features of this event. Instead, a suite of strategies is enacted to protect and repair the festival ritual, its history, community, and commercial interests in the wake of Corona’s attack. The paper draws upon extensive ethnographic and qualitative research, including a 7-month ongoing longitudinal phase of interviews with audiences and various types of organisers associated with three cancelled Danish music festivals, as well as a 9-month ongoing large-scale longitudinal media and netnographic analysis. We examine how agents of festivalisation - festival organisers, musicians, audiences, local entrepreneurs, and festival spaces – have gone about remembering, commemorating, and mobilising festivals in the wake of Corona. We explore the ways festival agents use materials, spaces, symbolic resources and creative strategies to respond to the external threat of the virus and reflect on who these festival agents are acting for, what they end up making, and why. Specificities of responses differ depending on festival type, history and context. Further, responses are also relationally and temporo-spatially anchored to interpretation of wider Corona developments. However, we observe widespread evidence of creative re-materialisations of festival experiences, pointing to processes of remembrance, repair, and the ongoing constructive re-making of ritual festival experience in novel contexts.

1. Background and GoalsA major challenge for public palliative care is to support all people who want to die at home. Last Aid Courses (LAC) have been started in 2015 to educate citizens and to empower them to participate in end-of-life care. The main goals of the International Last Aid project were to establish an International Last Aid working group and to provide and evaluate public palliative care education for citizens. 2. MethodsBetween 2017 and 2019 an International Last Aid working group with representatives from different countries and national organisations from e.g. palliative care, health-services, and the church as cooperation partners has been established. The curriculum and contents of the International Last Aid course are revised every other year by the International Last Aid working group. Scientific evaluation of LAC is coordinated by the international Last Aid Research Group Europe (LARGE) that was founded in September 2019. The experiences from he implementation process and the findings from the scientific evaluation will be summarised and presented during the Zoominar. 3. Results and ConclusionWork on LAC has been started in 17 countries as Denmark, Germany, Slovenia, Lithuania, Scotland, Ireland, Australia, Brasil, etc. The overall results show that the LAC is feasible and very well accepted in many different countries, cultures and groups. It has been used for adults, children and groups as hospital employees and policemen. LAC are even possible as online course format that was tested during the COVID-19 pandemic. Scientific work on cultural issues and the effects of Last aid Courses are ongoing in a number of countries. In conclusion Last Aid Courses are feasible and well accepted by citizens in different countries. The courses can contribute to a public debate on death, dying and palliative care and may contribute to empower citizens to provide end-of-life care. Keywords: Palliative care, public palliative care education, end-of-life care, home death, compassionate communities, Last Aid Course Biography: Dr. med. Georg Bollig, PhD, MAS, DEAA is a physician and researcher. He is a specialist in anaesthesiology, emergency medicine and palliative medicine with scientific work in various fields. He works as consultant in palliative medicine at the Medical Center Sønderjylland in Sønderborg, South Jutland Hospital, Denmark. Georg is a clinical associate professor in palliative care at the University of Southern Denmark. He invented Last Aid Courses and is the leader of Last Aid International and the international Last Aid working group. At present he is working on research projects about ethics, telemedicine and the effects of Last Aid Courses. The presented research has been performed without external funding.Presenting author details that will be used for Certificates and Id cardsDr. Georg Bollig, PhD, MAS, DEAA; Clin. Assoc. Prof. in Palliative Care Palliative Care Team, Medical Department Sønderborg/Tønder, South Jutland Hospital, Sønderborg, Denmark b Palliative Care research group, Medical Research Unit, Institute of Regional Health Research, University of Southern Denmarkc Last Aid International, Schleswig, GermanyEmail 1(Work): georg.bollig@rsyd.dkEmail 2(Personal): bollig.georg@gmx.deMobile: +49-17634747059Office Tel: +45-20168303ORCID iD: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0367-5295

We are writing this openly-published letter to express deep concerns regarding the paper recently published in JAMA Network Open: Estimation of US Children’s Educational Attainment and Years of Life Lost Associated With Primary School Closures During the Coronavirus Disease 2019 Pandemic DOI: 10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.28786The paper by Christakis, Van Cleve, and Zimmerman(2020,abbrev. CVZ) is built upon multiple critically flawed assumptions, obvious misuse of the standard analytical tools, and clear mistakes in study design. Additionally, the analysis presented contains crucial mathematical and statistical errors that completely revert the main results, sufficient that if the estimates had been calculated according to the declared methodology, the results would completely contradict the stated conclusions and policy recommendations. These are not idle criticisms. This study has received enormous public attention, and its results immediately appeared in discussions of public health policies around schools worldwide. The central question is resolving an evidence base for the inevitable tradeoff between (a) the very real harms of missed education provoked by policies that decrease viral spread vs. (b) the resumption of education as a social good which increases viral spread. This is an incredibly important public health question, and it demands careful cost-benefit analysis. To that end, this paper adds no usable evidence whatsoever.

Electricity theft caused a major loss for electricity power provider. The anomaly detection helps to predict the abnormal load usage of a consumer. Usually, the classification method used in anomaly detection. This research paper proposed to identify the potential anomaly points by using threshold and outliers. The prediction in time-series applied Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) algorithm. The historical electricity load dataset of a single industrial consumer was used to generate the prediction of electricity load. There were five optimizers used to produce the model: Adam, Adadelta, Adagrad, RMSProp, and Stochastic gradient descent (SGD). The prediction model was evaluated using mean squared error (MSE) and mean absolute error (MAE). The best model among all five models was generated by Adadelta optimizer with the error rate value of 0.091982 for MSE and 0.018433 for MAE. The prediction values were generated by this model. The anomaly point was detected by using threshold and outliers. The threshold value was 0.218983. One week in August 2019 was chosen to detect any anomaly load occurrences. There were 24 outliers were found within the selected week. The study shall expand on the electricity usage trend during COVID-19 pandemic period.

The State of the Art of WarThe world has entered the ‘second drone age’.1 Defined by the global proliferation of military Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and weaponised commercial drones, this new era of drone warfare has seen, and will continue to see, both state and non-state actors competing for power in the skies above (and beyond) designated zones of conflict. Hostile actors, with threatening remotely operated air power components, now vie for command of the air against NATO and al- lied forces. Civilian populations are at increased risk in this adjusted state of war. Ethical controversies from the first drone age have been exacerbated by the widespread use of distant lethal robotics, making it difficult to distinguish between the perpetrators of drone atrocities and attacks or accidents. This ‘deniability’ has important political, legal, and strategic implications. Holding actors to account, or retaliating against belligerents, is difficult in this deniable, multi-user context, where similar, if not identical systems, are deployed by myriad disparate actors. The second drone age also poses broader implications for international security, stability, and Great Power politics. Decisions about who joins the ‘global drone club’ are not made by accident, especially where the transfer of military UAS is concerned. The unrestricted supply of armed UAS to surrogate, partner, and proxy actors by state suppliers – of which China is one of the most prolific – will influence the fate of nations. As recent ‘State versus State’ drone wars in the Caucasus and Libya show, the politically motivated supply of military UAS has contributed to international instability and conflict escalation. The supply of both commercial and military-grade remote technologies to non-state actors, allegedly by countries like Iran or through commercial shell companies, exacerbate the manifest threats present in this altered security environment. The relaxation of commercial drone regulations in reaction to COVID-19 will only exacerbate this problem as belligerents seek to move against perceived weak-points. Put simply, new ‘Drone Powers’, and the ‘new drone world’, present fundamentally different challenges to those faced during the first drone age.i

The approach of this chapter is polemical in nature, reflecting the very fluid situation that lies ahead for orchestras post COVID-19. The chapter has three main academic research objectives. First, to put the current debate in context, it looks at the key challenges that orchestras have faced since the turn of the last century and in what way COVID-19 posed new problems that impacted orchestral music. The second objective is to outline some special short-term measures introduced to mitigate the impact of COVID-19, namely: (i) the income-support measures needed to sustain orchestras; and (ii) the extent to which orchestras could come together and practice, and in fact perform, even if only in front of no or very limited live audiences. The third objective is to discuss what possibly lies ahead for live orchestral music, post-COVID-19, and in a rapidly changing world regarding technological advances in the production and consumption of orchestral music. To inform this discussion, some broad trends in the ‘consumption’ of orchestral music over time, particularly in terms of numbers attending live concerts and revenues from streamed concerts, are examined.

This chapter examines public belief formation in Sweden during the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on theories of sociotropic belief formation, we analyze how citizens’ ideology, personal experience, interpersonal talk and media use influence their beliefs about how the coronavirus affects the Swedish society. The findings from analyses of three waves of panel survey data suggest that (1) citizens continuously update their corona beliefs over time, (2) ideological belief gaps emerge in the initial phase of the crisis but remain relatively constant over time, (3) corona beliefs primarily depend on ideology and news media use and (4) these two factors also influence the likelihood that citizens hold on to beliefs formed at an early stage of the pandemic. Furthermore, while news media use was more clearly related to perceptions about the magnitude of the coronavirus as a societal problem, ideology played a larger role for perceptions about how Sweden had managed the virus.